Table of Contents
Previous Section Next Section

12.8. Possible Attacks Against Memory Scanning

Unfortunately, memory scanning is subject to several possible attacks. The following points illustrate a number of possible attacks, and also note some solutions.

  • Encryption is a main problem, even under other operating systems such as DOS. Viruses might decrypt themselves in such a way that only a tiny window of decrypted code is available at a time.

  • Attackers can use in-memory polymorphic code to confuse scanners. For example, viruses such as Whale and DarkParanoid16 used this method on DOS, and W32/Elkern17 variants used it on 32-bit Windows systems. Such viruses can be detected only by algorithmic in-memory scanning.

  • Metamorphic viruses pose a similar problem. The code of such viruses also must be detected algorithmically in memory.

  • An attacker can implement viral code that jumps around in the process address space of a single application or injects itself into new processes and clears itself from the previous placelike a rabbit. This confuses on-demand memory scanners. On-access memory scanning can prevent this kind of attack.

  • An attacker could place virus code in multiple processes at once. In most current cases, this is an approach of retro viruses that fight back and do not allow termination. Consider an attack that has fragments of polymorphic or metamorphic routines running inside multiple host processes. The problem in both cases is that the scanner needs to have access to multiple process address spaces at the same time. Thus simultaneous access to all running process address spaces must be implemented. In this way, an algorithmic scanner can check process A and process B at the same time to make a correct decision.

  • A worm can run multiple copies of itself, each one keeping an eye on the other(s). Alternatively, a single thread is injected into another process that keeps an eye on the worm process. An example of the first attack is a variant of W32/Chiton. An example of the second attack is W32/Lovegate@mm. (The first variation of this attack is based on the self protection mechanism of the "Robin Hood and Friar Tuck" programs that, according to anecdotes, were developed at Motorola in the mid-1970s18.

  • The attacker can use in-memory stealth techniques by hooking the interfaces that the antivirus software will use. Some rootkits use this idea to avoid showing a malicious process on the process list. Similarly, worms can hide themselves using this approach. For example, several members of the Gaobot worm family hide their process names on the Task List, the Service Control Manager List, and even the worm image on the disk.

    Table of Contents
    Previous Section Next Section