4.1. Boot Viruses
Today the boot infection technique is rarely used. However, you should become familiar with boot viruses because they can infect a computer regardless of the actual operating system installed on it.
Boot sector viruses take advantage of the boot process of personal computers (PCs). Because most computers do not contain an operating system (OS) in their read-only memory (ROM), they need to load the system from somewhere else, such as from a disk or from the network (via a network adapter).
A typical IBM PC's disk is organized in up to four partitions, which have logical letters assigned to them on several operating systems such as MS-DOS and Windows NT, typically C:, D:, and so on. (Drive letters are particularities of the operating systemfor example, UNIX systems use mount points, not driver letters.) Most computers only use two of these partitions, which can be accessed easily. Some computer vendors, such as COMPAQ and IBM, often use hidden partitions to store additional BIOS setup tools on the disk. Hidden partitions do not have any logical names assigned to them, making them more difficult to access. Good tools such as Norton Disk Editor can reveal such areas of the disk. (Please use advanced disk tools very carefully because you can easily harm your data!)
Typically PCs load the OS from the hard drive. In early systems, however, the boot order could not be defined, and thus the machine would boot from the diskette, allowing great opportunity for computer viruses to load before the OS. The ROM-BIOS reads the first sector of the specified boot disk according to the boot order settings in the BIOS setup, stores it in the memory at 0:0x7C00 when successful, and runs the loaded code1.
On newer systems, each partition is further divided into additional partitions. The disk is always divided into heads, tracks, and sectors. The master boot record (MBR) is located at head 0, track 0, sector 1, which is the first sector on the hard disk. The MBR contains generic, processor-specific code to locate the active boot partition from partition table (PT) records. The PT is stored in the data area of the MBR. At the front of the MBR is some tiny code, often called a boot strap loader.
Each PT entry contains the following:
The loader locates the active partition and loads its first logical sector as the boot sector. The boot sector contains OS-specific code. The MBR is general-purpose code, not related to any OS. Thus IBM PCs can easily support more than one partition with different kinds of file systems and operating systems. This also makes the job of computer viruses very simple. The MBR code can be easily replaced with virus code that loads the original MBR after itself and stays in memory, depending on the installed operating system. In the case of MS-DOS, boot viruses can easily remain in memory and infect other inserted media on the fly. A few tricky boot viruses, like Exebug, always force the computer to load them on the system first and then complete the boot process themselves. Exebug changes the CMOS settings of the BIOS to trick the PC into thinking it has no floppy drives. Thus, the PC will boot using the infected MBR first. When the virus is executed (from the hard disk), it checks if there is a diskette in drive A:, and if there is one, it will load the boot sector of the diskette and transfer control to it. Thus when you try to boot from a boot diskette, the virus can trick you into believing that you indeed booted from the diskette, but in reality, you did not.
In the case of floppy diskettes, the boot sector is the first sector of the diskette. The boot record contains OS-specific filenames to load, such as IBMBIO.COM and IBMDOS.COM.
It is advisable to set the boot process in such a way that you boot from the hard drive first. In first-generation IBM PCs, the boot process was not designed that way, so whenever a diskette was left in drive A:, the PC attempted to boot from it. Boot viruses took advantage of this design mistake. By setting the boot process properly, you can easily avoid simple boot sector viruses.
If your system has a SCSI disk connected to it, the system might not boot from those drives first because it is unable to handle these disks directly from its BIOS.
4.1.1. Master Boot Record (MBR) Infection Techniques
Infection of the MBR is a relatively trivial task for viruses. The size of the MBR is 512 bytes. Only a short code fits in there, but it is more than enough for a small virus. Typically the MBR gets infected immediately upon booting from an infected diskette in drive A.
18.104.22.168 MBR Infection by Replacement of Boot Strap Code
The classic type of MBR viruses uses the INT 13h BIOS disk routine to access the disks for read and write access. Most MBR infectors replace the boot strap code in the front of the MBR with their own copy and do not change the PT. This is important, because the hard disk is only accessible when booting from a diskette whenever the PT is in place. Otherwise, DOS has no way to find the data on the drive.
The Stoned virus is a typical example of this technique. The virus stores the original MBR on sector 7 (see Figure 4.1). After the virus gets control via the replaced MBR, it reads the stored MBR located on sector 7 in memory and gives it control. A couple of empty sectors are typically available after the MBR, and Stoned takes advantage of this. However, this condition cannot be 100% guaranteed, and this is exactly why some MBR viruses make a system unbootable after infection.
Figure 4.1. The typical layout of the disk before and after a Stoned infection.
22.214.171.124 Replacing the MBR Code but Not Saving It
Another technique of viruses to infect the MBR is to overwrite the boot strap code, leaving the PT entries in place but not saving the original MBR anywhere. Such viruses need to perform the function of the original MBR code. In particular, they need to locate the active partition, load it, and give control to it after themselves.
One of the first viruses that used this technique was Azusa2, discovered in January of 1991 in Ontario, Canada. Viruses like this cannot be disinfected with regular methods because the original copy of the MBR is not stored anywhere.
Antivirus programs quickly reacted to this threat by carrying a standard MBR code within them. To disinfect the virus, this generic MBR code was used to overwrite the virus code, thereby saving the system.
126.96.36.199 Infecting the MBR by Changing the PT Entries
An easy target of MBR viruses is the partition table record of the MBR. By manipulating the PT entry of the active partition, a virus can make sure it loads a different boot sector, where the virus body is stored. Thus the MBR will load the virus boot sector instead of the original one, and the virus will load the original after itself.
The StarShip virus is an example of this technique. Some tricky viruses, such as some members of the Ginger family, manipulate the PT entries in such a way as to create a "circular partition"3,4 effect. Apparently this trick causes MS-DOS v4.07.0 to run in an endless loop when booted. Thus only a clean MS-DOS 3.3x or some other non-Microsoft-made DOS system, such as PC DOS, must be used to be able to boot properly from a diskette.
188.8.131.52 Saving the MBR to the End of the Hard Disk
A common method of infecting the MBR is to replace the MBR completely and save the original at the end of the hard drive, in the hope that nothing overwrites it there. Some of the more careful viruses reduce the size of the partition to make sure that that this area of the disk will not be overwritten again. The multipartite virus, Tequila, uses this technique.
4.1.2. DOS BOOT Record (DBR) Infection Techniques
Boot sector viruses infect the first sector, the boot sector of the diskettes. They optionally infect the hard-disk boot sectors, as well. There are more known infection techniques to infect boot sectors than there are to infect MBRs.
184.108.40.206 Standard Boot Infection Technique
One of the most frequently used boot infection techniques was developed in viruses like Stoned. Stoned infects a diskette's boot sector by replacing the 512-byte boot sector with its own copy and saving the original to the end of the root directory.
In practice, this technique is safe most of the time, but accidental damage to the content of the diskette can happen if there are too many filenames stored in the diskette's directory. In such a case, the original sector's content might overwrite the content of the directory; as a result, only some garbage is displayed on-screen via a DIR command.
220.127.116.11 Boot Viruses That Format Extra Sectors
Some boot viruses are simply too large to fit in a single sector. Most diskettes can be formatted to store more data than their actual formatted size. Not all floppy disk drives support the formatting of extra sectors, but many do. For example, my first PC clone's diskette drive did not support the access to these areas of diskettes. As a result, some copy-protected software simply did not work properly on my system.
Copy-protection software often takes advantage of specially formatted "extra" diskette sectors placed outside of normal ranges. As a result, normal diskette copying tools, such as DISKCOPY, fail to make an identical copy of such diskettes.
Some viruses specially format a set of extra diskette sectors to make it more difficult for the antivirus program to access the original copy during repair. However, the typical use of extra sectors is to make more space for a larger virus body.
The Indonesian virus, Denzuko, is an example that uses this technique. Denzuko was released during the spring of 1988. Unlike with most other viruses, the author of this virus is known. It was written by Denny Yanuar Ramdhani. The nickname of the virus writer is Denny Zuko, which comes from "Danny Zuko," the character in the popular musical movie Grease played by John Travolta5. This boot virus was among the first to implement a counterattack against another computer virus. Denzuko killed the Brain virus whenever it encountered it on a computer.
Figure 4.2. Payload of the Denzuko virus.
The extremely complex and dangerous Hungarian stealth BOOT/MBR virus, Töltögetö (also known as Filler), uses this technique as well. This virus was written by a computer student at a technical high school in SzE8kesfehE8rvE1r, Hungary, in 1991. Filler has formatting records for both 360KB and 1.2MB diskettes and format sectors on track 40 or 80 on these, respectively. These areas of the diskette are not formatted normally.
A benefit of such an infection technique is the possibility of reviving dead virus code. Reviving attempts were first seen in computer viruses in the early '90s. For example, some COM infector viruses would attempt to load to the very end of the disk, outside of normally formatted areas, and give control to the loaded sector. Many early antivirus solutions did not overwrite the virus code everywhere on the disk during cleanup. The boot sector of the disk was often fixed, and the virus code was considered dead in the diskettes' "out of reach" areas. Unfortunately, this provided the advantage of allowing virus writers to revive such dead virus instances easily, using another virus.
18.104.22.168 Boot Viruses That Mark Sectors as BAD
An interesting method of viruses to infect boot sectors is to replace the original boot sector with the virus code and save the original sector, or additional parts of the virus body, in an unused cluster marked as BAD in the DOS FAT. An example of this kind of virus is the rather dangerous Disk Killer, written in April 19897.
22.214.171.124 Boot Viruses That Do Not Store the Original Boot Sector
Some boot sector viruses do not save the diskette's original boot sector anywhere. Instead, they simply infect the active boot sector or the MBR of the hard disk and give control to saved boot sectors on the hard disk. Thus the diskette infection cannot be repaired with standard techniques because the virus does not need to store the original sector anywhere. Because the boot sector is operating systemspecific, this task is not as simple as replacing the MBR code; there are too many different OS boot sectors to choose from. Not surprisingly, the most common antivirus solution to this problem has been to overwrite the virus code with a generic boot sector code that displays a message asking the user to boot from the hard disk instead. As a result, a system diskette cannot be repaired properly.
A second, less common method is to overwrite the diskette boot sector with the virus code, which will infect the MBR or the boot sector of the hard disk. The virus then displays a false error message, such as "Non-system disk or disk error," and lets the user load the virus from the hard disk. The Strike virus is an example that uses this technique.
A further method to infect the boot sector of diskettes without saving is to mimic the original boot sector functionality and attempt to load some system files. Obviously, this method will only work if the virus code matches the system files on the diskette. The Lucifer virus is an example of this technique.
126.96.36.199 Boot Viruses That Store at the End of Disks
A class of boot viruses replaces the original boot sector by overwriting it and saving it at the end of the hard disk, like MBR viruses, which also do this occasionally. The infamous Form virus uses this method. It saves the original boot sector at the very end of the disk. Form hopes that this sector will be used infrequently, or not at all, and thus the stored boot sector will stay on the disk without too much risk of being modified. Thus the virus does not mark this sector in any way; neither does it reduce the size of the partition that contains the saved sector.
Another class of boot viruses also saves the boot sector at the end of the active partition and makes the partition shorter in the partition table to be certain that this sector is not going to be "free" for other programs to use. Occasionally, the boot sector's data area is modified for the same reason.
4.1.3. Boot Viruses That Work While Windows 95 Is Active
Several boot viruses, typically the multipartite kind, attack the new floppy disk driver of Windows 95 systems stored in \SYSTEM\IOSUBSYS\HSFLOP.PDR. The technique appeared in the Slovenian virus family called Hare (also known as Krishna) in May of 1996, written by virus writer Demon Emperor.
Viruses delete this file to get access to INT 13h, BIOS, real-mode interrupt handler while Windows 95 is active on the system. Without this trick, other boot viruses cannot infect the diskettes using INT 13h because it is not available for them to use.
4.1.4. Possible Boot Image Attacks in Network Environments
Diskless workstations boot using a file image from the server. On Novell NetWare file servers, for instance, the command DOSGEN.EXE can create an image of a bootable diskette, called NET$DOS.SYS, for the use of terminals. The terminals have a special PROM chip installed that searches for the boot images over the network.
This provides two obvious possibilities for the attacker. The first is to infect or replace the NET$DOS.SYS file on the server whenever access is available to it. The second is to simulate the functionality of the server code and host fake virtual servers via virus code on the network with images that contain virus code.